

S E C R E T

015 80-510/2

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300100019-7

4 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

25X1A ATTENTION: [REDACTED] Office of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Counterintelligence

25X1A FROM: [REDACTED] Information Management Staff, FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group, Initial Review Branch

SUBJECT: Protection of Identities of OSS Non-Agent Personnel

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Record from the undersigned, dated 4 August 1980, Subject: Conversation with [REDACTED] O/SA/DCI/CI, Regarding Release of the [REDACTED] to FOIA Requester Father Robert A. Graham

25X1A

1. With respect to our discussion of 31 July 1980 concerning your inquiry into the release of the [REDACTED] to FOIA requester Father Robert A. Graham and, specifically, with regard to the documentation you requested relating to the protection by the Agency of the identities of OSS non-agent personnel, you will find attached copies of the following documents:

25X1A

a. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, 11 April 1974, from Deputy Director for Management and Services, Subject: Amendment to OSS Declassification Guidelines, 3 pp.

25X1A b. Letter to Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, 25 April 1974, from [REDACTED] Archivist, 1 p.

25X1A c. Memorandum for DC/CCS/PRG, 3 May 1979, from [REDACTED] Chief, IMS/FOIA and Privacy Group, Subject: List of On Duty and Former Employees Whose Service Carried Over From CIA Predecessor Organizations, 1 p.

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2. By way of explanation, Document "a" contains a DCI-approved recommendation whereby the identities of OSS non-agent personnel would be no longer protected merely on the basis of subsequent service with CIA. Document "b" is a letter from the CIA Archivist advising the Director, Records Declassification Division, NARS, of the DCI's approval of an amendment to "Guidelines for Declassification of Office of Strategic Services Records," transmitted to the Archivist of the United States by DCI letter of 16 May 1973. Said amendment relates to the DCI's determination that the identities of OSS non-agent personnel need no longer be protected beyond thirty years merely on the basis of subsequent service with the CIA, the CIG or the SSU. Document "c" is a memorandum from Chief, IMS/FOIA and Privacy Group requesting updating of a list of on-duty and former employees whose service carried over from CIA predecessor organizations and whose identity requires continued protection today.



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Attachments: a/s

Added distribution:

1 - CRD w/atts

DIS:ydc (7 Aug 80)

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DD/1074-1715

Executive Registry

74-5382

DD/M&amp;S

74-1249

M/R 1974

MENORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Executive Assistant to the Director  
FROM : Deputy Director for Management and Services  
SUBJECT : Amendment to OSS Declassification Guidelines

1. Action Requested: Approval of change to "Guidelines for Declassification of Office of Strategic Services Records," transmitted to the Archivist of the United States by DCI letter of 16 May 1973.

2. Background: The extant guidelines prohibit the declassification of documents which identify individuals who subsequently served with US intelligence organizations, unless their affiliation with the OSS had been established in open source literature. In practical application, this restriction has been invoked only for individuals who have served with SSU, CIG, or the CIA inasmuch as reviewing officers have no way of knowing whether OSS veterans have worked for other intelligence organizations. While such documents retain their classified status, National Archives personnel are given authorization to release the documents to requestors after having sanitized the records by excision of names.

The existence of this restriction necessitates a page-by-page review of all documents, thereby ruling out the possibility of blanket declassification of otherwise non-sensitive STATINTL record series or groups. (Such authority has been requested

Quite apart from the declassification workload factor, it is questionable whether the policy of protecting the former OSS affiliation of CIA employees is either effective or necessary. The fact that an individual served with the OSS does not, or should not, automatically make him suspect. Of the approximately 20,000 veterans, less than 1,000 wound up with the Agency--and more than half of these are now separated, often in an overt status. Moreover, it is apparent that many Agency employees who served with the OSS have made no effort to conceal that fact when questioned concerning their World War II activities.

The effort to conceal the former OSS affiliation of CIA employees by deleting their names from documents may have the opposite effect from that intended. It is entirely possible that the requester's curiosity could be stimulated to the point that he would make a determined effort to discover what had been excised. And he might very well be successful in this endeavor, particularly if, as is often the case, the individual whose name was removed had served as a member of a team and the other team members were identified in the document. A number of avenues are open to an enterprising researcher. He might be able to determine the identity of "X" by contacting other team members, by uncovering references in open literature, or by gaining access to other related OSS records (they "pop up" in university libraries and elsewhere) which enumerate the entire membership of the group. The end result would be that the Agency, in withholding an individual's name in order to protect his current intelligence connections, raised suspicion and increased the risk of exposure.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that, in the interest of expediting the declassification review of OSS records and in view of the dubious wisdom of the current policy, the OSS declassification guidelines be changed to no longer require the protection of identities of OSS non-agent personnel merely on the basis of subsequent service with the CIA.

Harold L. Brownman  
HAROLD L. BROWMAN  
Deputy Director  
for  
Management and Services

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CONCUR:

STATINTL

[Redacted]  
Deputy Director for Operations

APPROVED:

/s/ W. E. Colby

16 APR 1974

DISAPPROVED:

W.E.C.  
W.W.

10  
cc

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ISAS:CES:s1h  
(3 April 1974)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

25 April 1974

Mr. Edwin A. Thompson  
Director, Records Declassification Division  
National Archives and Records Service  
Seventh Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Alan:

This is to advise you that on 17 April 1974 the Director of Central Intelligence approved an amendment to "Guidelines for Declassification of Office of Strategic Services Records," transmitted to the Archivist of the United States by DCI letter of 16 May 1973.\* Paragraph 1, under the heading Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals (pp. 1-2), is affected by the change. Specifically, the Director of Central Intelligence has determined that the identities of OSS non-agent personnel need no longer be protected beyond 50 years merely on the basis of subsequent service with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Group, or the Strategic Services Unit.

The document authorizing this change is on file in this office. It is not planned to issue a revised version of the "Guidelines" document. This may be done at some future date, however.

STATINTL It would be appreciated if you would notify Dr. Rhoads of this action. A copy of this letter is enclosed for Mr. [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*

|S|

STATINTL

[REDACTED] ARCHIVIST

STATINTL

Vcc: [REDACTED]

3 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/CCS/PRG (U)

25X1A  
FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Chief, TMS/FOIA and Privacy Group (U)

SUBJECT: List of On Duty and Former Employees Whose Service  
Carried Over From CIA Predecessor Organizations (U)

1. The attached list is being forwarded to you for updating and  
return to us. (U)

2. By way of background, in February 1977, CCS was provided a  
46-page roster headed On Duty Employees and Former Employees Who Were  
Former COI, OSS, SSU, or CIA Employees. CCS annotated this roster by  
inscribing the letter "C" to the left of the name of any of the listed  
officers whose name required protection from release whenever it appeared  
in predecessor documents, either because the person listed in the roster  
was a current CIA employee or one who had retired in a covert status.  
For ready reference, the attached list was prepared from the CCS-annotated  
roster, which we presently hold and which we should be happy to make  
available to you should you wish to consult it. Since the names of  
predecessor organization employees are not routinely protected from  
release when they appear in predecessor organization paper, the list is  
valuable because it cites the names of employees described above who  
require protection today. (U)

3. Your cooperation in providing us with the updated list is  
appreciated. (U)

25X1A

Attachment: a/s

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